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RECENT STATUTES
CONTRACTS-CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AND FOR RESCISSION No LONGER INCONSISTENT.
-By Chapter 315 of the Laws of 1941, a new section 112-e has been added to the
Civil Practice Act.1 The enactment, which became effective on September 1, 1941,
makes yet another inroad into the doctrine of election of remedies. 2 It provides, in
substance, that claims, arising out of fraud or misrepresentation in the inducement
of a transaction, for rescission and restitution of benefits on the one hand and for
damages on the other shall not hereafter be deemed inconsistent, so long as there
is no duplication of items' of recovery.
Adopted at the instance of the Law Revision Commission,3 the statute is directed
at the rule laid down in this jurisdiction in Weigel v. Cook.4 In that case defendant,
by fraudulent representations as to the existence and capacity of mineral springs
on certain land, had induced the plaintiff to purchase the land. The purchase price
was $15,000. Of this, $5,000 was paid in cash and security given for the balance
of $10,000. Prior to discovery of the fraud, plaintiff had expended an additional
$4,000 for improvements. In an action for rescission, the lower courts had directed
repayment of the $5,000 and cancellation of the security. In addition, plaintiff
had recovered a judgment for the $4,000 he had expended for improvements. This
latter item was stricken out by the Court of Appeals. Plaintiff, having elected to
rescind the transaction, was, the court concluded, barred from recovering damages
based on an affirmance of it.
The avowed purpose of rescission is to restore the injured party to the statits
quo ante. The rule of election of remedies, as applied in the Weigel case, frustrated
this purpose. Plaintiff, to be sure, could have recovered the $4,000 had he elected
to bring an action at law in deceit. But such an election would have compelled
1. "Claim for damages and rescission not inconsistent; complete relief in one action.
A claim for damages sustained as a result of fraud or misrepresentation in the inducement
of a confract or other transaction, shall not be deemed inconsistent with a claim for
rescission or based upon rescission. In an action for rescission or based upon rescission
the aggrieved party shall be allowed to obtain complete relief in one action, including
rescission, restitution of the benefits, if any, conferred by him as a result of the trans-
action, and damages fo which he is entitled because of such fraud or misrepresentation;
but such complete relief shall not include duplication of items of recovery." N. Y. Civ.
PRAC. AcT § 112-e.
2. Previous enactments in New York limiting the application of the doctrine are:
N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 112-a (prior action against one of several wrongdoers or recovery
of unsatisfied judgment therein no bar to subsequent action against another such wrong-
doer); N. Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 112-b (prior action against either agent or undisclosed
principal, after disclosure of such principal, or recovery of unsatisfied judgment therein
no bar to subsequent action against other); N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 112-d (prior action,
either in conversion or confract, against one of several persons liable, or recovery of
unsatisfied judgment therein no bar to subsequent action against others, either in con-
version or contract); N. Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 112-d (judgment denying recovery in
action on written agreement no bar to action for reformation of such agreement).
3. N. Y. LAW REvIsIoN CommissIoN LEGis. Doc. (1941) No. 65(L).
4. 237 N. Y. 136,\142 N. E. 444 (1923); N. Y. LAw REvISION CommIssIoN LEGis. Doc.
(1941) No. 65(L) p. 3.
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him to retain land he did not want, and to pay the balance of the purchase price
as it became due.
As the study of the Law Revision Commission points out, other jurisdictions have
not felt constrained to press the doctrine of election of remedies to this extreme.5
A distinction has been made in some cases between the effect of rescission
on the right of the injured party, to recover the contract measure of damages on
the one hand and his right to the tort measure of damages on the other. 6 An in-
jured party, who has repudiated a contract, should not be allowed a recovery
based on the contractual measure of damages, i.e., one which would put him in as
good a position as he would have been had the contract been performed. But there
is no reason why he should not be compensated for losses actually sustained so as
to put him in as good a position as he was in prior to the misrepresentation.
The same conclusion has been defended on another ground. Rescission has
properly been held to preclude recovery of items of general damage, since such items
would be duplicative of the relief already granted. But no such argument can be
advanced for refusal of special damages, such as the $4,000 expenditure in Weigel v.
Cook.
The phrase "fraud or misrepresentation" employed in the new statute suggests
certain questions. For example, are claims arising out of careless, as distinct
from deliberate, misrepresentations within its purview? It is not clear whether
the use of "or" is explanatory or alternative. The discussion of the Law Revision
Commission, confined almost exclusively as it is to the classic action of deceit,
would seem to indicate the former. But the term, misrepresentation, is commonly
given a broader meaning. It is frequently applied to any assertion which is contrary
to fact, whether made honestly and with due care or with scienter or negligently. 7
Rescission will lie even for an innocent, non-negligent misrepresentation.8 No
problem of election arises in such a case, however, since an action for damages
would not be maintainable. 9 But liability in damages as between the immediate
parties for bona fide but negligent misrepresentations is now well established,' 0
although its exact limits remain to be defined."' The doctrine of election of remedies
would probably be applicable in such cases. 2 There is every reason why a liberal
5. See authorities pro and contra as collected and discussed in N. Y. LAW REvIsiol
CommissioN LEmis. Doc. (1941) No. 65(L) pp. 40-53.
6. American Pure Food Company v. Elliof, 151 N. C. 393, 66 S. E. 451 (1909);
Phares v. Jaynes Lumber Co., 118 Mo. App. 546, 94 S. W. 585 (1966); Rogge, Damages
Upon Rescission for Breach of Warranty (1929) 28 MicH. L. Rav. 26, 5 WirnusoN,
CONTRAcrs (rev. ed. 1937) § 1464.
7. 3 RE STATEmNT, TORTS (1938) 56-59; HARPER, THE LAW OF TORTS (1933) §§ 219,
222; BoHIEN, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty (1927) 42 HAv. L. REv.
773; RESTATENT, REsTrruTior (1936) §§ 8, 28.
8. Hammond v. Pennock, 61 N. Y. 145 (1874); Blomquist v. Farson, 222 N. Y.
375, 118 N. E. 855 (1918); Seneca Wire & Mfg. Co. v. Leach & Co., 247 N. Y. 1, 159
N. E. 700 (1928).
9. Reno v. Bull, 226 N. Y. 546, 124 N. E. 144 (1919).
10. Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922); International Products
Co. v. Erie R. R. Co., 244 N. Y. 331, 155 N. E. 662 (1927),
11. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931).
12. N. Y. LAw REvisioN ComwIssioir, LEcis. Doc. (1941) No. 65(L) p. 60.
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construction of the new section 112-e of the Civil Practice Act should make it applic-
able as well.
Section 69 of the Uniform Sales Act' 3 makes the doctrine of election of remedies
applicable to claims for rescission and for damages arising out of a breach of
warranty. In the broad sense a false express warranty is undoubtedly a misrepre-
sentation 14 and the two statutes would therefore seem to be in conflict. The report
of the Law Revision Commission offers no light on the problem.' 5
A purchaser of chattels, who sues upon a breach of express warranty, need
prove no more about the representation than that it is false. Where such a
representation is, in addition, intentional or careless, a plaintiff in New York
who now seeks both rescission of the sale and special damages arising out of it
may be confronted with this problem: if he states a cause of action in deceit or
negligence he must sustain an additional burden of proof as to scienter or lack of
card; if, on the other hand, he relies in his rescission suit on a cause of action for
breach of warranty he runs the risk that section 112-e of the Civil Practice Act will
be held inapplicable and thereby of forfeiting his claim for special damages. He
will, therefore, have to plead both. But such a pleading would merely pose the
problem not resolve it.
It has been held that the Uniform Sales Act will be construed so as to make for
uniformity. "Doubts, if there are any, may well be resolved in favor of the ruling
that will make for the larger uniformity."' 6  Likewise it has been held that a
general statute will not be construed as repealing one covering a particular subject
matter, unless they are irreconcilably in conflict.' 7 But neither of these rules is
helpful here since there is radical disagreement as to the scope of the doctrine of
election under section 69 both between other jurisdictions' s and between the authori-
ties in New York.
In Waldman Produce, Inc. v. Frigidaire Corporation'0 the Appellate Term in the
Second Department, criticizing Weigel v. Cook, held that an action for the price
based on rescission for breach of warranty did not under section 69 bar recovery of
damages for loss of produce stored in a refrigerator which did not conform to the
warranty. But there is authority squarely to the contrary in New York.20 The
13. N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 150. Cf. Introductory Comment to the Further Remedy
Sections § 60 f., Sxco-D Da-r or Rnws SALrs ACT (on proposed abolition of election
of remedies in sales cases).
14. N. Y. LAW REmvxoN CmOMnssioN, LEc s. Doe. (1941) No. 69(L) p. 61.
15. Cf. N. Y. LAW Rxvisox CosmlsTo, LEOss. Doc. (1941) No. 65(L) p. 33.
16. Cardozo, J., in Standard Casing Co. v. California Casing Co., 233 N. Y. 413,
418, 135 N. E. 834, 835 (1922).
17. Chew Heong v. U. S., 112 U. S. 536 (1884); Crosby v. Patch, 18 Cal. 438 (1864);
State ex rel. Gates v. Commissioners of Public Lands et al., 106 Wis. 584, 82 N. W.
549 (1900).
18. Rogge, Damages Upon Rescission for Breach of Warranty (1929) 28 MICH. L. REv.
26 and N. Y. LAw RpvisioN CoN assiox, Lra~is. Doc. (1941) No. 65(L) contain reviews
of the authorities.
19. 157 Misc. 438, 284 N. Y. Supp. 167 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Note (1936) 45 YALE
L. J. 1313.
20. Bennett v. Piscitello, 170 Misc. 177, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 69 (City Ct. Rochester, 1938),
rev'd on other grounds, 259 App. Div. 964, 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 777 (4th Dep't 1940), aif'd
without opinion, 285 N. Y. 584, 33 N. E. (2d) 251 (1941).
[Vol. 11
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question awaits authoritative decision in the light of the new enactment by the
appellate courts.
MORTGAGES-EPFECT OF MORTGAGE STATEMENT FILED BY MORTGAGEE Or USED
CARs.-Prior to the enactment of Section 230-b of the Lien Law,1 motor vehicle
dealers in New York had no practical method of financing used cars. In many
sales of new automobiles, a used car is accepted by the dealer in part payment
of the purchase price. Since few dealers have sufficient capital to carry these used
cars until they are resold, there is a need for outside financing. The same need
existed formerly, with respect to the financing of new cars purchased by the dealer'
from manufacturers. It was solved by the adoption of The Uniform Trusts Receipts
Act.2 Trust-receipt financing is ineffective, however, as a method of financing used
cars for the reason that the dealer is already the owner and is in possession of
the cars.3
The procedure generally resorted to by most dealers is to give a chattel mortgage
on the used cars to a financing agency. Mortgagees of motor vehicle dealers are
usually finance companies. As an incident to its activity, in order to induce a
dealer to place his business of financing new cars for retail purchasers with it, a
finance company is ordinarily obliged to aid the dealer in financing used cars taken
in on the sale of new vehicles. Prior to the enactment of 230-b, it was, in most
cases, necessary for motor vehicle dealers to comply with Section 230-a of the
Lien Law in order to execute a valid chattel mortgage. Section 230-a of the Lien
Law requires the mortgagee to obtain from the mortgagor, a written list of the
creditors of the mortgagor. He must then notify each of these creditors of the
proposed mortgage and the terms and conditions thereof, when the mortgage is
intended to operate as a mortgage upon a stock of merchandise in bulk, or any
part thereof. Corporate mortgagors were also required to comply with Section 16
of the Stock Corporation Law. In effect this section provides that a stock corpora-
tion must first have consent to the execution of a mortgage from two-thirds of
the holders of the outstanding voting stock, in writing, or by vote at a Stockholders'
meeting called for that purpose. A certificate that such consent was given must
also be filed in each county in which the mortgage is filed. To satisfy these require-
ments each time a used car was financed proved not only cumbersome but expensive.
As a practical matter, therefore, frequently the motor vehicle dealers failed to
1. N. Y. Laws 1941, c. 94 relating to chattel mortgages on agricultural crops was
numbered N. Y. LIEN LAW § 230-b. Inadvertently N. Y. Laws 1941, c. 842 was like-
wise called N. Y. LIEN LAw § 230-b. This latter section concerns mortgage statements and
is the subject of this discussion. Discussion of the other 230-b appears infra.
2. N. Y. PEns. PROP. LAW §§ 50-58.
3. See Bacon, A Trust Receipt Transaction II. (1936) 5 FoRDHAm L. REv. 240.
4. "The purpose of the bill is two-fold (1) To provide an effective and safe method
by which used motor vehicles owned and possessed by a motor vehicle dealer may
be financed for the dealer. No such method now exists. The bill does not involve in
any way financing of retail purchases of automobiles. (2) That buyers of automobiles
in the ordinary course of business from dealers may be protected against any liens
represented by chattel mortgages upon the cars so purchased." Summary of Salient Features
of Senate Introductory Bill, 1071 (1941) PAMPHLET OF THE AUTOMOBILE MERCHANTs AssocrA-
TION OF NEW YoRx, INc.
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comply with the requirements of these sections, and more often did not file a chattel
mortgage. Obviously, under such conditions, the mortgagee had no protection, what-
soever, not even against creditors of the motor vehicle dealer, to say nothing of the
buyer in the ordinary course of trade.
The main purpose behind the passage of this statute, therefore, seems to be to
aid the financiers of used car dealers by providing a cheap, expeditious method of
filing. At the same time the statute is also designed to protect bona fide pur-
chasers for value in the regular course of business. Subdivision 6 of the statute
provides: "A buyer in the ordinary course of trade, purchasing from a dealer any
motor vehicle or motor vehicles covered by any such chattel mortgage or mortgages
shall acquire such motor vehicle or vehicles free and clear of the lien or encum-
brance of said chattel mortgage or mortgages." 5  Before this statute, the New
York Courts, although in the minority,6 held that if a mortgage was filed under
the old method, a bona fide purchaser was not protected, even though the mortgagee
allowed the mortgagor to display his cars at his place of business.7
Financing companies acting as mortgagees thus seem willing to sacrifice their
rights against buyers, in the ordinary course of trade, to procure a practical financing
procedure for used car dealers. It is common knowledge that a purchaser of a
used car from a dealer rarely makes any investigation to see whether or not the car
is encumbered. It seems unfair, that he should take subject to a mortgage, even
though recorded, when the mortgaged vehicle is in the possession of the dealer,
ostensibly for sale. Therefore, this part of the statute is commendable.
It should be remembered that a financing company's chief concern is not to be pro-
tected against the buyer in ordinary course of trade. If a dealer sells mortgaged
vehicles without accounting to the mortgagee, he will soon find great difficulty in
procuring willing mortgagees. Protection against creditors of the dealer is more
necessary. Section 230-b gives such protection. The creditors of the dealer are
not treated unfairly. They may readily ascertain from the mortgagees whether
or not a particular vehicle or vehicles are the subject of the chattel mortgage state-
ments. The statute is a distinct advance. The parties to the financing plan have
an inexpensive and effective method of financing used cars, and the buyer, in the
ordinary course of trade takes the vehicle free and clear of any filed chattel
"Mortgage Statement."
Under the terms of the statute, mortgagees who contemplate receiving a series
of chattel mortgages to be executed by motor vehicle dealers may file a "Mortgage
Statement" upon payment of a nominal filing fee.9 Such "Mortgage Statement"
5. N. Y. LIzr LAw § 230-b, (6).
6. See Winakur v. Sapourn, 156 Md. 662, 145 At. 342 (1929); American Aggregates
Corporation v. Wente, 100 Ind. App. 59, 190 N. E. 552 (1934).
7. In Utica Trust & Deposit Company v. Decker, 244 N. Y. 340, 155 N. E. 665 (1927),
the defendants, although innocent purchasers, were held- to take subject to the recorded
mortgages. The mortgagees were not estopped from claiming title fo the mortgaged
automobiles, although possession was accorded the mortgagors who were motor vehicle
dealers.
8. "Any person who contemplates receiving as mortgagee a series of chattel mortgages
to be executed by a motor vehicle dealer, covering motor vehicles of which the dealer
at the time of execution of said chattel mortgages shall have ownership and possession,
may cause a mortgage statement to be filed and indexed in the same manner and place as
[Vol. 11
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is filed in the same place and manner as other chattel mortgages. When so filed, this
statement is operative for a term of three years-an appreciable relaxation of the
more burdensome requirements of Section 235 of the Lien Law.' 0
After the "Mortgage Statement" is filed, any interested person may, by a written
demand, inquire of the mortgagee, whether or not any specified motor vehicle is
subject to the lien of the "Mortgage Statement". Neglect on the part of the mort-
gagee to furnish this information defeats his lien against the demanding person. If
he does give such information his lien is effective. Likewise if the statement is
filed, the creditors of the mortgagor are subject to the mortgage when they make no
inquiry of the mortgagee.
As already stated the statute expressly protects the buyer of such a mortgaged
vehicle, who purchases in the ordinary course of trade, from the lien or encum-
brance of such mortgage." The wording of the statute, however, suggests the
possibility of different interpretations.
One construction might be that even though a chattel mortgage is filed in the for-
mer customary manner, under the Lien Law, a purchase in the regular course of
trade would not be held to have constructive notice and would take free of the
mortgage because of subdivision 6.
This, indeed, would be an anomalous situation. A second, more probable con-
struction, is that subdivision 6 applies, when only a "Mortgage Statement" has been
filed, and not otherwise. A purchaser in the regular course of trade takes free
of the encumbrance, when only a "Mortgage Statement" is filed, as provided for
in Section 230-b. In other words, a court might say, that Section 230-b in no
way affects a chattel mortgage when it is filed under the old method, because the
provisions of 230-b are merely supplementary. Thus, it would hold that with
respect to chattel mortgages filed under the old method the law remains the same,
and the "filing would be constructive notice to purchasers. They would take subject
to the mortgage.
Then there is a third construction. In view of the purpose and general legislative
intent, a court might decide that in the case of an isolated chattel mortgage on
a used car, where the mortgage is filed under the old customary manner of filing,
chattel mortgages are required to be filed and indexed under this article." N. Y. LmrN
LAw § 230-b (1).
9. One dollar for each mortgage statement filed in counties outside the City of New
York and two dollars in counties within the Cify of New York. N Y. LIME LAW
§ 230-h (3).
10. N. Y. LEN LAW § 235 requires the mortgagee to file a renewal statement within
thirty days preceding the expiration of the first of any succeeding term of one year,
calculated from the time when the mortgage was first filed. A mortgage not so renewed
ceases to be valid, and the mortgagee loses the protection of his lien as against subsequent
creditors, purchasers or mortgagees.
11. The statute defines the term "buyer in the ordinary course of trade" within the
meaning of this Section fo be "a person to whom a motor vehicle or vehicles is or are sold
and delivered for new value, and who acts in good faith, including one who takes by con-
ditional sale. It does not include a pledgee, mortgagee, lienor, transferee in bulk, or
another dealer in motor vehicles. 'New Value' as used in this section means a new con-
sideration in money or other property actually paid or agreed to be paid or delivered,
or new obligation incurred; . . ." N. Y. LiN LAW § 230-b (6).
1942]
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the purchaser would not be protected, and would be held to have constructive notice
of the mortgage. But if chattel mortgages, in a series, are executed by a motor
vehicle dealer, regardless of whether they are individually filed in accordance with
the old method, the purchaser in the regular course of trade will take free of the
lien of the mortgage. This interpretation is most logical taking cognizance of the
words "such chattel mortgage or mortgages" in subdivision 6, and then referring
back to the wording of subdivision 1.
MORTGAGES-RiGHTS OF SUBSEQUENT CREDITORS AS AGAINST CHATTEL MORTGAGEES
OF AFTER ACQUIRED PROPERTY.-By reason of a recent amendment to the Lien Law,'
it is now possible in New York, in some situations, for a prior mortgagee of a chattel
mortgage on after-acquired property to obtain a right superior to a subsequent
execution creditor of the same property. The amendment is extremely limited in
its application. It only covers the situation where a chattel mortgage on crops2
to be grown within one year is given by a farmer in order to secure the purchase
price of seeds, fertilizer, feed and other such materials which are to be used in
growing the crops which are the subject of the mortgage8 When such a mortgage is
duly filed, the mortgagee will be free from the danger of levy by a judgment creditor
on the chattels.
There was need for the alteration in the law, since some confusion has arisen in
New York with regard to chattel mortgages of after-acquired property. While
a mortgage on property not in existence at the time of the mortgage is void at law,
equity takes the view that when the property is acquired by the mortgagor, an
equitable mortgage attaches to that property. 4 In arriving at this conclusion, the
courts of equity do not require an express agreement by the mortgagor to give a
formal mortgage when he later acquires the property.5 Rather the basis of the
equitable encumbrance is the advance of credit by the mortgagee in reliance on
an understanding that when the property comes into the hands of the mortgagor,
it will be posted as security for the debt so incurred-a situation for which there
is no adequate remedy at law. However, when the question has arisen as to the
priority of this equitable lien as against a subsequent purchaser without actual
1. N. Y. Laws 1941, c. 94, effective March 14, 1941, amending the Lien Law by in-
serting § 230-b. The Legislature has, apparently by inadvertence, added two sections 230-b
to the Lien Law. The one herein considered is the section dealing with the effect of a
chattel mortgage on after-acquired property.
2. "As used in this section, the terms 'crop' and 'agricultural crops' mean all crops
of the soil, whether annual or perennial, and shall include fruits and berries; it shall also
include poultry, other domesticated birds and fowl and any increase or accretions thereof."
N. Y. Lim LAW § 230-b (1).
3. "Any mortgage executed under . . . this section may provide that the mortgagor
shall have the right to sell any part of the mortgaged crop under the conditions stated in the
mortgage, if the proceeds of such sale are applied upon the mortgage debt or subject to the
lien of said mortgage, or are permitted to be used for the purpose of paying the expense of
cultivating, . . . the remaining portion of the crop covered by the mortgage, . . ." N. Y.
Lmnn LAW § 230-b (3).
4. Holroyd v. Marshall, 10 H. L. Cas. 191, 11 Eng. Rep. R. 999 (1861).




notice or a levying creditor, the courts of New York have not been consistent.
Until this amendment, the law as to intervening third parties was established by
two leading cases, Kribbs v. Al!ord6 and Rochester Distilling Ca. v. Rasey.7 In the
former a mortgage was given designed to cover after-acquired property which was
properly filed according to the statutory provisions.8 Subsequently the property
included in the mortgage was acquired by the mortgagor and transferred to a
purchaser for value without actual notice. The Court of Appeals held that there
was a good equitable mortgage as against the purchaser inasmuch as the filing
constituted constructive notice to him. In Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey the
facts were quite analogous, with a similar chattel mortgage, duly filed,9 but instead
of a purchaser of the mortgaged property intervening a subsequent creditor levied
on the property covered by the mortgage. The court took the view that irre-
spective of filing, the creditor acquired rights superior to those of the holder
of the equitable mortgage.' 0 That this was an unusual decision is clear from the
fact that an innocent purchaser for value has always been favored by the courts in
a controversy with the holder of an equitable interest in the same property. Yet,
by the holding of the Rasey case, not only was the execution creditor placed on a
level above a purchaser, but he stepped into a position better than that of his
debtor in that he took free of the equitable mortgage, which, of course, was valid
as between the original parties to it.'.
To arrive at its conclusion in the Rasey case, the court reasoned that an equitable
defense could not be interposed in a strictly legal action,' 2 and that the recording
provisions for chattel mortgages were not intended to give effect to a mortgage on
goods not then in existence. The latter ground for the decision, however, was not
observed in the Kribbs case where the rights of an innocent subsequent purchaser
were subordinated to this type of mortgage. If in one case filing and indexing a
6. 120 N. Y. 519, 24 N. E. 811 (1890).
7. 142 N. Y. 570, 37 N. E. 632 (1894).
8. N.Y. LIEN LAw § 230.
9. While the fact of filing did not definitely appear in the Court of Appeals Opinion,
the lower court pointed out that the mort'gage had been filed in accordance with the
statutory provisions. Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 65 Hun. 512, 20 N. Y. Supp. 583
(1892).
10. "The statute provides for the filing as a substitute for 'an immediate delivery,'
or 'an actual and continued change of possession of the things mortgaged.' Such pro-
visions seem to me to exclude the idea of a chattel mortgage upon non-existent things;
or that such an instrument could operate to defeat the lien of an attaching, or an execution
creditor upon subsequently acquired property." Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142
N. Y. 570, 579, 37 N. E. 632, 634 (1894).
11. "That the purchaser who has bought in good faith should be chargeable with
notice of the record of the mortgage of future chattels and should be subject to the
mortgage, but that such a mortgage should not be valid and enforceable against an attach-
ing creditor is a curious legal incongruity." Stone, The "Equdtable Mortgage" in New
York (1920) 20 CoL. L. RFv. 519, 528. See also JoNs, CnAT- MORTGAGES (5th ed.
1908) § 173.
12. The court so held despite the fact that there was express statutory provision for
the use of an equitable defense in an action at law. N. Y. CODE OF CIV. PROC. §§ 257,
258, now N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 262. Furthermore, the merger of law and equity was




chattel mortgage provides constructive notice, it would seem it should be binding
notice to all subsequent persons dealing with the property equitably encumbered.' 3
However, the court decided that such a mortgage was not within the terms of the
filing provisions of the Lien Law, although in the earlier Kribbs case a subsequent
purchaser for value without actual notice was bound by such filing.14 The two
irreconcilable cases were each reenforced by later decisions. 15
On equitable principles it would seem that the rule of the Kribbs case is sound and
should be extended to cover chattel mortgages on all later-acquired property. 16
Most states agree with the rule of this decision and hold contra to the principles
set forth in the Rasey case,17 which has been considered illogical.' 8 Hence, in
whittling down the effect of this decision, the new amendment is good as far as it goes;
however, it must be regarded as an extremely feeble effort by the Legislature.
The present amendment deals only with crops. It will be remembered that the
Rasey case also dealt with agricultural produce. It would seem to suggest that
the Legislature overlooked the fact that the Rasey case set up the law with
respect to all chattels and was not limited to the subject-matter involved in that suit.
However, subsequent cases have sustained the principle of that case with reference
to other chattels.' 9
So narrow is the new section that a mortgage on resulting crops to secure articles
other than seed, fertilizer, feed, or other such materials is not within the meaning
of the amendment.20 With the New York law on mortgages of later-acquired
personal property undeniably in need of revision it is difficult to see why the Legis-
lature did not do a complete job.
13. BowERs, CHATTmL MORTGAGES (1933) §§ 140, 141, 143.
14. In both cases the chattel mortgage was duly filed.
15. Following the Kribbs case: Duffus v. Bangs, 122 N. Y. 423, 25 N. E. 980 (1890);
Central Trust Co. v. West India Imp. Co., 169 N. Y. 314, 62 N. E. 387 (1901). Following
the Rasey case: Titusville Iron Co. v. New York, 207 N. Y. 203, 100 N E. 806 (1912)
(involved a forfeiture under a breach of contract, not a mortgage); Zartman v. First
National Bank, 189 N. Y. 267, 82 N. E. 127 (1907).
16. "That there should be any distinction in the policy of the recording act or in
principle between the rights of the de facto innocent purchaser and the creditor in the
case of a recorded mortgage of future goods does not seem open to question. One who
in good faith has advanced his money in the purchase of chattels in the possession of
the mortgagor certainly should not be in any worse position than the levying creditor who
has made no advance on the faith of them." Stone, The "Equitable Mortgage" in New
York (1920) 20 CoL. L. REv. 519, 528
17. Andrews Mercantile Co. v. Rice, 187 Ala. 468, 65 So. 388 (1914); Wheeler v. Becker,
68 Iowa 723, 28 N. W. 40 (1886); Thompsmn v. Fairbanks, 75 Vt. 361, 56 AtI. 11 (1903);
Hudson v. Kootenai Fox Farms Co., 47 Idaho 58, 272 Pac. 704 (1928); Hickson Lumber
Co. v. Gay Lumber Co., 150 N. C. 281, 63 S. E. 1048 (1909); Creech v. Long, 72 S. C.
25, 51 S. E. 614 (1905); Richardson v. Washington, 88 Tex. 339, 31 S. W. 614 (1895).
18. "In any event the curious inconsistencies and complications of the law relating
to such security call for comprehensive reform and unification." Stone, The "Eqzdtable
Mortgage" in New York (1920) 20 CoL. L. Rav. 519, 535.
19. See note 15, supra.
20. So limited is the new amendment that the purchase by a farmer of a household
utensil would not be within the section. Indeed, the purchase of an insecticide to eliminate
the destruction of the crops would probably not be covered by it.
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